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Abstract THE POTENTIALITY FOR STATE FAILURE VIA ORGANIZED CRIME. ACTIONS OF THE JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP (JIACG) IN MITIGATING RISK FOR THE COMBATANT COMMANDER
In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) organized crime has virtually taken control of the State. The resultant impact has been the paralysis of democratic development, alienation of ordinary citizens, and correspondingly the failure and distrust of the state legal and security services in a region that is already extremely unstable. The degradation of state institutions (especially police and judiciary), a breakdown in law and order, and a loss public confidence in the government are symptomatic of conditions we have seen in other parts of the region and the world that have lead to state failure.
As the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom have shown the U.S., and consequently the geographic combatant commander, can ill afford to ignore distressed or failing states. For the combatant commander a new staff organization called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) provides him with an additional "tool" or means to influence actions not normally associated with traditional military functions. Designed to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies in order to improve planning and coordination primarily to combat terrorism, the make-up and focus of the JIACG is optimally positioned to address the issue of organized crime's destabilizing influence on FYROM.
This paper examines the role of the US European Command (USEUCOM) JIACG in mitigating the risk for the commander of potential state failure in FYROM as a result of the destabilizing influence of organized crime on its government and society.
INTRODUCTION
America is now threatened less by the conquering states than we are by failing ones.
U.S. National Security Strategy 2002
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the United States has been heavily engaged in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). After over a decade of debate, U.S. leadership has come to the conclusion that the threat to its national interests and security is not going to be from another state or peer competitor with conventional armed forces. Instead the threat will come from small groups of non-state actors who find support and refuge from rogue, failing or failed states. As Robert Rotberg aptly states in his article "Failed States in a World of Terror,"
"Although the phenomenon of states failure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worrying than ever before." i Accordingly, the United States, and consequently the combatant commanders, have shifted their attention and resources to addressing the dangers associated with state distress and failure and the conditions they create for non-state actors to impact U.S.
national security interests.
One of the outgrowths of 9/11 and the GWOT is the United States reaffirmation and attempt to rectify a well known and long standing strategic and operational shortfall -the lack of civilmilitary interagency level coordination and cooperation. Even before 11 September 2001 events such as the attack on the USS Cole, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and our response to the situation in the Balkans revealed a significant seam in U.S. policy and strategy.
The impetus of 9/11 has lead senior administration officials to support the establishment of a Joint Inter Agency Coordination Group (JIACG) at the geographic combatant command level to act as a link between those commands with the agencies, allies, and in some instances coalition partners in combating terrorism. Designed to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies, the JIACG has the potential to improve planning and coordination in not only activities related to terrorism, but also in areas not normally associated with the traditional military functions of the combatant commander. More importantly, the JIACG provides the commander with an additional "tool" that will improve his situational awareness and assist him in influencing actions within his area of responsibility.
While the focus of the GWOT, and consequently the JIACG, has been primarily oriented on 
What is a JIACG?
Per U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), "The JIACG is as a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community." iii Though USJFCOM has been charged with conducting the initial experimentation on the JIACG, the utility of the group has already proven itself, particularly in U.S. Central and U.S Pacific Command's actions in support of the GWOT. To date, the organization, structure, and functions of the JIACG has yet to be codified, but given the urgency of the current world situation, each geographic combatant commander has embraced the concept and have staffed and structured their own groups according to their theater specific requirements. 
What is a Failed State?
The problem of failed or failing states in our current international system is like the uninvited guest at a party; the overwhelming impulse is to ignore it, to treat it as insignificant, and to hope it will go away Second -ethnic, social or economic class or ideological competition which already weak political and social institutions are unable to ameliorate.
Third -the combined effects of poverty, over-population, rural flight and rapid urbanization as well as environmental degradation overwhelm weak institutions and heighten social competition and conflict.
vi
The preceding definitions or conditions will be useful when examining the impact organized crime is having on Macedonia and the potential threat to regional security.
Organized Crime in FYROM and the Potentiality for State Failure
Every country has a mafia but only in Macedonia does the mafia have a country.
Robert Hislope, "Organized Crime in a Disorganized State"
Macedonia occupies a central position within Southeast Europe and is often referred to as the "Crossroads of the Balkans." Owing to its deep seated ties to its former Ottoman rulers the culture has accepted many traits which are not considered traditionally Western European such as the "bakshish -the ever-present tip or bribe -as well as certain types of political rule and political corruption are all part of the 'Balkan style." vii Accordingly, the general population within Macedonia is not uncomfortable with a "manageable" level of graft and vice. However, following the collapse of the communist system and frontier controls throughout most of the Balkans, organized crime syndicates began to flourish resulting in lawlessness and civil conflict.
Due to the lack of strong institutions and control mechanisms, these syndicates found an ideal situation to exploit in the Macedonian political structure, especially as it transitions from a communist totalitarian system to a democratic, free market economy. Press International (UPI) reported that Greek intelligence officials had offered that, Skopje, even before the current rebellion, had become an "anything-goes" open city. They said regional Balkan crime syndicates and major Russian criminal organizations alike were taking advantage of the weak young national government and the chaotic conditions caused by the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo conflict. These groups had made Macedonia a major center for drug smuggling and traffic in the so-called "white slave trade" of organized prostitution that has grown apace in Central Europe over the past decade, the Greek sources said. "Peace and stability are not profitable to the criminal elements in Macedonia and they are now very well entrenched," he said. As a result, he predicted, the rebellion would prove to be "a long-enduring conflict of low intensity. The problem is that because of it, people there (in Macedonia) are not trusting each other any more. has been admittedly linked to organized crime and has been implicated in terrorist like activities.
In particular, the KLA have funded their activities in the region through drugs and smuggling.
Correspondingly, evidence suggests that the guerrillas claiming to be fighting for equal rights, the development of better schools and the recent constitutional amendment in Macedonia weren't so much fighting for those constitutional reforms as they were fighting for control of a growing
Albanian-run criminal empire. Speculation is that these kingpins are actively seeking to destabilize the entire region because peace is bad for business. Moreover, the impact the KLA and organized crime had in the 2001 internal conflict "obliged Macedonia to increase its spending on defense and internal security" xiii at the expense of other necessary services. The estimated cost to Macedonia was "well in excess of $500 million (or c. 15% of its GDP)." xiv Many experts believe that organized crime is flourishing in Macedonia (as well as the republics of the former Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries) because the rule of law is frail and the judiciary is not independent. Some argue that the issues are predominantly a police problem that can only be resolved with the help of strong police forces and law enforcement.
However, this view fails to take into consideration that in order for the rule of law to function there must be trust in the government, an independent judiciary and uncorrupted officials.
Evidence shows the syndicates have great influence upon political life within Macedonia to the point of being able to influence and present national positions and platforms. Sadly, Organized crime enjoys the protection of high-ranking Macedonian politicians, judges and prosecutors who are generously bribed further eroding public confidence in the overall system.
Why is Organized Crime Important to the Commander USEUCOM?
There are at least three distinct, yet interrelated reasons organized crime and its impact upon other aid agencies, the region will increasingly become a major haven for drug traffickers, people smugglers, and Islamic militants. Moreover, without more rapid reconstruction, the regions poverty levels will continue to rise, fueling mass migration into surrounding countries.
"Neglecting these challenges will have a severe and destabilizing consequence for southeast Europe, including growing poverty; an increase in illegal economic activity, including trafficking in people and drugs; further human displacement; and a greater likelihood of political extremism, insurgency, and terrorism." xv Balkans 2010 also contends that, despite the lower U.S. interest in the region due to the GWOT, the U.S. still has an important stake in rebuilding the area because the region could become a major source for illegal drugs and anti-American terror. Beyond that the report expresses that failure to establish long-term stability in the Balkans will feed criticism in Europe and throughout the Muslim world that the U.S. is more interested in making war than in keeping the peace.
Second, on 29 April 2003, the Commander, USEUCOM, General James L. Jones outlined plans for establishing an array of skeletal bases and occasional-use training areas in Eastern
Europe that would allow the United States to reduce its military presence in Western Europe.
According to the Washington Post, General Jones said, "As the alliance moves to the east, we're trying to develop a concept that allows our forces to do peacetime engagement around a greater portion of our theater." xvi He also said, "that two former communist states, Bulgaria and Romania, which made bases available to U.S. forces during the war in Iraq, represent "extremely good candidates" for the kind of arrangements under consideration." xvii Given the location of Romania and more importantly Bulgaria, the basing of U.S. troops in the region might have a stabilizing influence on Macedonia's internal situation; however, on the other hand, based on the insidious nature and scope of organized crime in the region, the Commander, USEUCOM will also have to face a serious force protection issue.
Third, General Jones also serves simultaneously as Commander, USEUCOM and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Therefore, wearing his SACEUR "hat," he obviously has to consider the impact a destabilized Macedonia has on not only the U.S., but also on NATO and de facto the European Union (EU). The EU and NATO have invested a significant amount of time, effort and resources into the region. While U.S. interest may be waning, the security to the region is imperative to the European community.
How can the JIACG assist the commander in mitigating the risk of state failure?
As should be evident from the preceding analysis, the Commander, USEUCOM faces a different threat in Macedonia than he may face elsewhere. The situation, while serious, does not necessarily rate a traditional military response. Arguably, the JIACG, with its integrated military/interagency staff is optimally placed to assist the commander in addressing these issues in a more indirect manner. Joint Publication 3-08 establishes that, "within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of theater and regional military strategies that require interagency coordination." xviii The addition of the JIACG not only improves the commander's situational awareness, but also assists him in coordinating the planning and synchronization of all instruments of national power within his area of responsibility (and where possible U.S. allies and coalition partners).
In combating the threat of organized crime in Macedonia, the JIACG can make its most immediate impact in several areas to include, planning and coordination, institutional knowledge, and information sharing. A fundamental strength of the U.S. military is the ability to plan and coordinate major operations while conversely, U.S. agencies are neither manned nor trained to conduct the detailed planning and operations on the same scale as the military. The wide spread diversity of the JIACG provides the combatant commander with a more expansive collection of area specialists with which to plan, organize, and synchronize the activities of the civil-military interagency team at the theater/operational level.
In the specific case of Macedonia, the Commander, USEUCOM already has a plan for Team works for the Ambassador. Accordingly, the level of cooperation and integration of planning will vary from embassy to embassy.
Another critical strength of the JIACG is the institutional interagency knowledge the various agency representatives provide to the combatant commander and their capability to share information both laterally and horizontally. These representatives will be trusted to be their respective organizations duty experts and will be expected to be armed with the knowledge and background of their particular agencies positions on a variety of issues to include how best to influence problems related to organized crime. For example, some of the necessary skills that will be required include knowledge of money laundering laws, financial disclosure requirements, extradition treaties, and search and seizure rules to name but a few. Given the preceding it is In taking on the issue of organized crime in Macedonia the Commander USEUCOM will require significant support from both the US and international community. The first task is to understand the nature and scope of the problem and to identify participants. Working in conjunction with the U.S. interagency and the allies, the commander can synchronize, task and/or recommend through the respective agencies the assignment of assessment teams of experienced agency representatives, law enforcement officials, military personnel, and perhaps maybe even non government agency representatives to evaluate those areas critical to national power and security in Macedonia while ensuring a unity of effort. "Deploying these teams as a priority matter will indicate strong determination to identify and uproot entrenched criminal elements." xx Counterargument Some would argue that the purpose of the JIACG is to focus on terrorism and not organized crime. This is an extremely shortsighted view considering the potential "operational" multiplier the actions the various agency experts might provide to the combatant commander. While terrorism is inarguably the priority of effort for the United States, it is difficult to imagine that the intent that went into designing and recommending the JIACG was for it to only be used to conduct counter terrorism operations. Moreover, anticrime programs addressing various disciplines (narcotics, organized crime, money laundering, illegal migration, terrorism, etc) naturally complement each other both directly and indirectly. The environments in which terrorist and organized crime members operate are remarkably similar and to think that there wouldn't be some amount of spillover of information and intelligence that would be useful to the commander (in either case) would be ridiculous. Moreover, given the new focus of the National Security Strategy, a combatant commander would be viewed as negligent if he didn't address those issues associated with state failure (of which a case can be made that organized crime is a major contributor).
Admittedly one of the more difficult issue for the combatant commander isn't necessarily combating organized crime itself, but in information and intelligence sharing with our allies.
Since 9/11 there has been a more open policy on sharing information pertaining to the GWOT; however, obtaining and trading information remains problematic. It would be naïve to believe that countries will openly share information especially given the United States penchant for stamping "NOFORN" on most security documents. However, if the United States were able to reciprocate (at least to some degree) there is still a better chance of obtaining some international organizational assistance for the JIACG that in turn can only benefit the U.S. and the commander.
Arguably the most difficult issue surrounding the JIACG is resourcing. The collective total of the interagency is miniscule in comparison to DoD and these organizations are neither funded nor manned at the same level as the military. Therefore, it is unrealistic to think that these agencies will be willing to give up two or three of their precious assets to the combatant commanders without some form of compensation. However, when considering the lessons learned from 9/11 (and the past), the United States can ill-afford to ignore the importance of civil-military interagency coordination and cooperation. It is incumbent upon U.S. national leadership to rectify this long standing shortfall.
Conclusion
Helping Macedonia and for that matter the Balkans engineer a successful future "requires a unique combination of urgency and patience: urgency, because problems such as organized crime… present[s] a constant threat of instability; patience, because there are no overnight solutions and because, to maintain public support, these fragile democracies may have to proceed cautiously on occasion." xxi The evidence supports the impact organized crime is having on Macedonia. Moreover, when compared to the conditions that precede or cause state failure, the situation should create concern for the Commander, USEUCOM. Even though U.S. interest currently lies elsewhere (Iraq and Afghanistan), it has invested too much time and resources into the Balkans to walk away now.
As the most recent NSS underscored, the most immediate threat to the United States are rogue and failing states and the non-state elements associated with them. The political, economic and financial instability in Macedonia is providing a fertile ground for organized crime. The growing stratification of society, unemployment and poverty has reached high levels and career opportunities are limited. Local conflicts, fear of crime and lack of trust in the capacity of the state to protect citizens from crime erode the concept of democratic governance. In the absence of effective control mechanisms the situation for Macedonia is grim. The JIACG can provide the combatant commander with another asset to address exactly this kind of threat. If properly focused and used in conjunction with both national and international as provided by NATO and the EU, the Commander, USEUCOM can mitigate a potential Balkans Afghanistan.
Interestingly, the majority of the operations the United States has participated in since the end of the Cold War have involved failing or failed states; however, it has taken the cataclysmic events of 11 September 2001 to awaken the U.S. to this situation. As Susan Woodward so aptly stated, "For the armed forces, this prospect appears to leave only two choices: for the military to adapt doctrine, train for these contingencies directly, and be prepared to move early; or for the nation to push harder for prevention." xxii Arguably prevention is the preferred course of action.
